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SUBSTANCE OF TEE SrEECII 



MADE BY 



6ERRIT SMITH, 

/./r Turn c^riTOLi 



STATE OF NEW YORK, 

A i^VnO MARCH nth AND 12th, 1850. 



^ ? 



/.LB ANY: 
JACOB T, HAZEN, PRINTER. 

1850. 



(T -V '^ 



ARGTJIEIT. 



Mr. Smith beg'an with saying, that the following Petition?, numer- 
ously signed, had been presented to the Legislature, the present Session : 
To the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York : 

What a wonder, what a shame, what a crime, that, in the midst of the 
light and progress of the middle of the nineteenth century, such an abomi- 
nation and outrage, as slavery, should be acknowledged to be a legal in- 
stitution ! Who, that reverences Law, and would have it bless the world, 
can consent, that its sanction and support, its honor and holiness, be given 
to such a compound of robbery, and meanness, and murder, as is slavery "? 

Your petitioners pray, that your Honorable Bodies request the Repre- 
sentatives and instruct the Senators of this State in Congress to treat the 
legalization of slavery as an impossibility; and, moreover, to insist, that 
the Federal Constitution shall, like all other laws, be subjected to the strict 
rules of legal interpretation, to the end, that its anti-slavery character be, 
thereby, seen and established, and all imputations upon that character for- 
ever excluded. 

The slaveholder will be strong, so long as he can plead law for his 
matchless crime. But take from him that plea, and he will be too weak to 
continue his grasp upon his victims. It is unreasonable to look for the 
peaceful termination of slavery, whilst the North, and especially whilst 
abolitionists of the North, sustain the claim of the South to its Constitu- 
tionality. But, let the North, and especially abolitionists of the North, 
resist, and expose the absurdity of, this claim — and slavery, denied there- 
after all countenance and nourishment from the Constitution, will quickly 
perish. 

Your petitioners will esteem it a great favor, if your Honorable Bodies 
will consent to hear one or more of them in behalf of the prayers of their 
Petition. 

January 22, 1850, 

To the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York: 

The undersigned Petitioners, request your Honorable Bodies to give 
Gerrit Smith a public hearing on the question, whether Slavery has any 
legal existence under the Federal Constitution T 

February 14, 1850. 

Mr. Smith said, that it was in consequence of these Petitions, that he 
had the privilege of speaking on this occasion. He confessed, that he felt 
embarrassed by the latter Petition. Its designation of himself had, as he 
apprehended, excited far higher expectations of his powers of advocacy 
than he should be able to satisfy. 



Mr. Smith proceeded to say, that God made man ia His own image — " a 
little lower than the angels" — and " crowned him with glory and honor." 
But slavery seizes upon tliis exalted being, and hurls him down from the 
high place, where his Maker put him, to a place among " four footed beasts 
and creeping tilings." The language of the slave-code is: — " The slave 
shall be taken, reputed, held, sold, as a chattel, to all intents and purposes 
and constructions whatever." Such is the fraud, such is the piracy, on 
human rights, of which slavery is guilty. It strips its victim of every 
right. It subjects him to every wrong. It reduces him to a brute. It 
classes him with brutes. Southern advertisements run : — " To be sold on 
such a day, and at such a place, so many horses, so many men, so many 
women, so many children, so many cows, so many wagons and carts." 
It was a strange freak of fancy and folly in the Roman ruler, who elevated 
his favorite horse to the dignity of tbe consulship, and exacted for that 
horse the homage of his degenerate countrymen. But what more strange 
is it to turn a horse into a man, as did the Iloman ruler, than to turn a 
man into a horse, as does slavery ! 

Horrible and abominable, howpver, as is slavery, it is, nevertheless, claim- 
ed, that the Federal Constitution legalizes it, or, at least, admits its legality, 
and protects its existence. Our reply to this claim is, that slavery is inca- 
pable of legalization ; and that no paper, however authoritative, can legal- 
ize it, or sanction its legality, or protect its existence. Law is for ihe^ro- 
ieclion of rights — not for the destruction oi rights. But murder itself is not 
more decisively and sweepingly destructive of rights than is slavery. 
Nay, it is not so much so ; — for murder is only one of the elements in 
the infernal compound of slavery. Law is simply the rule, or require- 
ment of natural justice. To attempt, then, to identify it with naked, avowed 
and the very extremest injustice — what can be more absurd^ This at- 
tempt, so well nigh universal, to confound law with the opposite of law j 
justice with injustice; right with wrong; is, of itself, sufficient to explain 
the prevailing want of reverence for true law, and the readiness with which 
men cast off its just requirements. Never, until it be universally admitted, 
that Law commands only what is right, and prohibits only what is wrong, 
will Law be uuiversally respected and obeyed. 

No man has seen more clearly, or expressed more glowingly and efTec- 
tively, than Henry Brougham, the impossibility of legalizing slavery. 
" Tell me not of rights," says that mighty man. " Talk not of the prop- 
erty of the planter in his slaves. I deny the right. I acknowledge not 
the property. The principles, the feelings, of our common nature rise in 
rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to the understandiug, or to the 
heart, the sentence is the same, that rejects it. In vain, you tell me of 



laws, that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments 
of human codes. It is the law written by the finger of God upon the heart 
of man; and by that law, unchanj^eable and eternal, while men despise 
fraud, and loathe rapine, and abhor blood, they shall reject with indig- 
nation the wild and guilty fantasy, that man can hold property in man." 

We wonder at the laws of our ancestors for putting witches to death. 
We pity their superstition and delusion. But our posterity will won- 
der much more at our laws for reducing men to slavery : — and they will 
-execrate the avarice and wickedness, which prompted us to enact and ex- 
ecute such laws. 

The just and high ground, that slavery is too iniquitous and foul and 
monstrous a thing to be, by any possibility, embodied and sheltered in the 
forms of law, should be taken by every one. But, for the sake of the argu- 
ment, I come down from this high ground, and admit the possibility of 
legalizing slavery. The question, then, for me now to address myself to, 
is whether the Constitution be a law of slavery, or whether it forbids it. 
But, before entering upon the discussion of the question of the Constitution- 
ality of slaver5'-, I wish it to be distinctly understood, and fully admitted, 
that this is not a historical question — but a le^al question : and, that to 
ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, we are to. subject it, as we do, 
any other law, to the strict rules of legal interpretation. Obeying these 
rules, we are 

1st. To look after the intention of the adopters of the Constitution. 
The intention of its framers we do not need to concern ourselves with any 
more than with the intention of the scrivener, whom we employed to write 
the deed of a parcel of land. 

2d. To gather the intention of the adopters of the Constitution from the 
letter of the Constitution. "Language'", said Tallyrand, "is the art of con- 
cealing the thoughts." Such may, possibily, have been the design of many 
of the talks and writings of some of the adopters and some of the framers of 
the Constitution. Men, who are engaged in writing a statute, may talk 
and write concerning it with the view uf misleading people in regard to its 
meaning. It is true, that they may also, frame the statute to that very end. 
But, it is agreed on all hands, that we are compelled to take the statute, so 
far as it is intelligible, as the only evidence of their meaning and intention. 

3d. Obeying these rules of interpretation, we are, where the letter of the 
Constitution is unintelligible, or ambiguous, to go out the Constitution into 
the collateral evidences of its meaning. This, however, only for the 
purpose of establishing an innocent meaning — a meaning in consonance 
with justice. There is no such liberty of range for the purpose of fasten- 
ing upon the Constitution a construction at war with justice. From suck 
a construction the Constitution must be spared^ unless its letter absolutely 
and inevitably demands it. In this declaration I am fully sustained by the 
rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
.against Fisher and others (2 Cranch 390.) " Where rights are intringed, 
where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of 
She laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed wiiJi 



irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to ef- 
fect such objects." To illustrate this rule, and apply it to the present case. 
If it be claimed, under the Constitution, that one man may rob another of 
his horse, the right to do so mu<t be expressed in the Constitution, and ex- 
pressed loo with irresistible clearness. So too, and much more emphati- 
cally, if it be claimed, under the Constitution, that one man may rob another 
of his liberty — of himself — of his all — the right must be, not inferred — not 
implied — but couched in express and irresistibly clear terms. 

4th. Another of these rules requiies, that if injustice and slavery, as 
well as justice and liberty, be in the Constitution, and that if either must 
be thrown out for inconsistency, it must be injustice and slavery. We 
must treat ourShylock of slavery, as thelau-s of Venice treated her Shy- 
lock. If our Shylock of slavery must have his pound of flesh, why then 
he must have it. But he shall take nothing more — no, not even one drop 
of blood. And not even his pound of flesh shall he be allowed to take, if, 
to take that, he must needs take aught — even one drop of blood — besides. 
Or to drop the figure' — if there are provisions for slavery in the Constitu- 
tion, and they cannot operate but at the expense of subverting provisions 
in it for liberty, then such provisions for slavery must not be allowed to 
operate. 

I will not, at this stage of my remarks, mention any other of the rules, 
by which the Constituiton is to be interpreted. In the progress of the 
discussion, I may have occasion to mention others. 

All admit, that if there was no legal slavery in this country, at_the time 
the Constitution was adopted, the Constitution did not legalize any. All 
admit, that the Constitution did, at the most, but repeat the legalization of 
slavery ; or, rather, did but approvingly recognize already existing slavery. 

Was there any legal slavery in this country, at the time the Constitution 
was adopted ? The Colonial Charter, surely, did not authorize it : for 
these charters all forbade, that the laws of the Colonies should be repug- 
nant to the laws of England • and what the laws of England were, in res- 
pect to slavery, is manifest from the celebrated decision of the King's 
Bench in 1772. That was the desision, that, in England, there is no right 
of property in man. That was the decision wrung from Lord Mansfield. 
The like decision — the decision, that there cannot be in America any right 
of property in man — will, at no distant day, be wrung from the Courts of 
America. It was the indomitable perseverance of an humble layman, 
Granville Sharp, which compelled Lord Mansfield to withstand the tide of 
slavery in England. Would, that there were such a layman to compel 
the Courts of America to withstand the tide of slavery in America ! I do 
not flatter myself, that the Courts, in any part of the world, will proceed, 
self-moved, to a very self-denying duty. The powers that be, whether 
in Church or State, are quite too conservative — quite too deeply interested 
in continuing the present condition of things — to volunteer in comprehen- 
sive and radical reforms. 



Shameful were the expedients, which Lord Mansfield resorted to to 
etave off the decision in this case. Shrinking- from the responsibility of 

pronouneinp; judgment, he would, from time to time, postpone the duty. 

He was even so cowardly, as repeatedly to suggest, that the matter mio-ht 
be ended by the claimnant's manumitting his slave. Mansfield was not 
the only great man, who, in that crisis, allowed himself to be swayed and 
overawed by a corrupt and wicked public sentiment. Blackstone was as 
guilty as he, in this respect. He had, previously, published the 1st Edition 
of his Commentaries. In that Edition he held the following truthful lan- 
guage : 

" And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our Constitution 
and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he 
lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and with regard to 
all national rights, becomes eo instant i a freeman." 

But, in the course of the trial, which so shook the nerves of poor JMans- 
field, the 2d Edition of Blackstone's Commentaries was published. In 
that Edition he changed the words: "and with regard to all national 
rights, becomes eo instanti a freeman" into the words : " and so far be- 
comes a freeman — though the master's right to his service may possibly 
remain." Such was Blackstone's subservience to the pro-slavery senti- 
ment, which then reigned in England. What wonder, if such men, a3 
Mansfield and Blackstone, could consent to be the servants of the slave- 
power, that the great men of America also should consent to a similar 
self-degradation ! Human nature is the same in America, as in Eno'Iand. 
But, thanks to our Maker, slavery can no more live always in America 
than it could in England. What is law — true and righteous law — in respect 
to slavery, will yet be declared by the Courts of America : and the declara- 
tion will be as fatal to slavery in America, as was the like declaration to 
slavery in England. 

Lord Mansfield's decision was, of course, as applicable to the Colonies, 
as to England herself. If there could be no legal slavery in England, then 
there could be no legal slavery in the Colonies. Alas, that there was not 
a disposition in the Colonies to apply Mansfield's decision to the abolition 
of Colonial slavery ! Had there been, the present generation in America and 
that, which preceded it, would have been saved from the curse of slavery. 
But, it is said, that laws haa been enacted in the Colonies, by the terms of 
which persons could be held in slavery. I deny, that a fair and legal inter- 
pretation of these terms warrants this conclusion, or any approach to thia 
conclusion. Read these laws— and you will find, that they assumed (as. in- 
deed, is the case with all slave-laws,) that slavery 1' ' already an existence 
— a rightful, not to say legal, exiilence. Moreover, you will fiod, that 



their description of its victims was quite too indefinite and vague to idea-' 
tify them ; and that, hence these laws were void for uncertainty. What, 
however, if there were not these objections to these laws 1 The laws 
were nevertheless, unconstitutional and void, because at war with 
the Charters, which ware the Constitutions of the Colonies. But, it is 
said, that slavery was tolerated in the Colonies after Mansfield's decision. 
So it was in England also. But toleration, neither in the Colonies, nor in 
England, should be taken for, or confounded with, legalization. I will 
read a part of an advertisement to show, that it was tolerated in England 
after Mansfield's decision. It is dated, "Liverpool, Oct., 15th, 1779." 

" To be sold by auction at George Dunbar's office, on Thursday next, 
the 21st inst., at 1 o'clock, a black boy, about fourteen years of age, &:c.'' 

To show that it was tolerated in England before IMansfield's decision, I 
will read another advertisement. 

"Public Advertiser, Tuesday, 22d Nov. 1769, 
To be sold a black girl,^ the property of J. B., eleven years of age, 
who is extremely handy, works at her needle tolerably, and speaks Eng- 
lish perfectly well — is of an excellent temper and willing disposition. En- 
quire of Mr. Owen at the Angel Inn, behind St. Clements Church in the 
Strand." 

These relics of England's pro-slavery literature very strikingly remind us 
of the like species of literature abounding in our Southern newspapers. 

I pass on to the Declaration of Independence : — and I ask — what if- 
there had been, down to the putting forth of that paper, legal and consti- 
tutional slavery in this land, did not that paper put an end to such slavery? 
That paper, more than any other paper, which ever was, or ever shall be, 
uttered the heart of the American people. That paper will, so long as this 
nation shall endure — and God grant that it may endure unbroken and un- 
divided to the end of time ! — (Mr. Smith was here interrupted by repeated 
applause.) I confess most unaffectedly, said Mr. Smith, that I welcome your 
applause of the prayer, which fell from my lips. But, I would have my hear 
ers remember, that if the union of these States shall endure, it must be 
cemented by justice — by justice to the red man and the black man, as well 
as to the white man — by justice to all men. Expedients, from which jus- 
tice and truth and mercy and God are shut out, are not the expedients for 
maintaining the union of these States. All such expedients will prove 
abortive. I have seen the recent propositions of some of our eminent 
statesmen for preserving the American Union. They are, perhaps, charac- 
terized by wisdom. But it is the wisdom of this world — not *' the wisdom 
which Cometh from above.'' They are, indeed, propositions for peace. But 
••'the wisdom; which cometh from above, is first pure — </ien peaceable." 



Now, there is no purity, no integrity, no religion, in these propositfonff. 
Moreover, the peace, which they propose, is an evanescent, becaiu^e a 
spurious, peace. The peace, that is permanent, is the peace, that follows 
puiJt) — is the peace, which is the offspring of purity. These propositions 
are full of murderous wrong to millions. Had they involved known and 
deliberate wrong to but one person — and that one person the least black 
baby in all the South — even then God could not have been in the proposi- 
tions, and His blessing could not have been upon them. The peace, that 
could come from such propositions, must, at best, be but the peace of the 
wicked : — and, as God is true, "there is no peace to the wicked." 

To return, said Mr. Smith, to what I had bes;un to say, when your patri- 
otism and partiality interrupted me — the Declaration of Independence will,, 
so long as this Nation endures, be, for some ])urposes, the highest Consti- 
tutional authority ia the Nation. This paper settled it forever in the 
minds and hearts of our countrymen, that self-government is the right of 
every people. Tn every part of our land, men of all parties in religion and 
politics fall back upon the Declaration of Independence, as the highest 
Constitutional authority, that every people have the right of self-govern- 
ment. In respect to this transcendently important right, this paper lies at 
the basis of both the Federal and State Constitutions. It is the very soul 
of these Constitutions — the Constitution of Constitutions. But what does- 
the Deelaraiion itself set forth, as the ground of this right of every people 
to self-government 1 It sets forth, as that ground, that all men are created 
equal, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable 
rights. And can we, then, go to this paper for authority for this right, 
and yet reject the very ground and reason for it, which the paper itself 
sets forth "? Certainly not. If the Declaration of Independence be our 
authority for the self-government of a people, equally is it our authority for 
maintaining, that freedom is the birth-right of all. 

Suppose, that, during the American Revolution, an American had been 
arraigned, before an American Court, for treason to the Crown — could he 
not have successfully plead the Declaration of Independence to prove his 
right to break his allegiance to the Crown ? None doubt it. \/hat, how- 
ever, if he had been arrested, the next day, as a fugitive slave 1 Ought 
not his plea, that the same paper recognizes liberty to be the birth-right of 
all, to be just as successful, as was his plea, the day previous 1 Certainly. 
For the same paper, which he quoted, the day before, makes the right of a 
people to self-government grow out of the inalienable right of the indivi- 
dual to liberty. I hold, then, that if there ever were legal slavery in this 
country, it ceased forever, when the American people did, witt well nigh 
one consent, adopt that immortal paper, which declares all men to be crea- 

2 



m 

ted equal, and to have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursTirs 
of happiness. Well may the Declaration be, as it has ever been, inex- 
pressibly dear to every true American heart. That slaveholders — that 
they, who buy and sell men as hogs — should call it "a fanfaronade ol 
nonsense," is not strange. 

Ere proceeding to examine the Federal Constitution, I admit (for such 
admission is required by the rules of interpretation, which I have laid 
down) that, provided the letter of that instrument is clearly and certainly 
anti-slavery, or clearly and certainly pro-slavery, I am not to meddle with 
history. If, hov/ever, its letter be anti-slavery^ though more or less doubt- 
fully so, then I may go into history to fortify that letter, and to establish 
the anti-slavery character of the Constitution. Now, on the supposition 
(which is, however, only a supposition,) that the letter of the Constitu- 
tion is but doubtfully anti-slavery, I am at liberty to refer to pieces of 
history, which go far to show, that the Constitution is necessarily anti- 
slavery. Its framers would not allow the word " servitude "^ in the 
Constitution, because it expresses the condition of slaves, and they would 
have the word " service " in its stead, because it expresses the obligations 
of free persons. Mr. Madison was not objected to, when he said, that he 
" thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea, that there could 
be property in man." I do not say what were their intentions, as to keep- 
ing slavery out of, or getting it into, the Constitution — for what their in- 
tentions were, is, as I have already said, immaterial. But I do say, that 
there are various historical proofs, that the framers of the Constitutioii 
sought to have it wear a fair face for justice and liberty — so fair, that if 
after ages should learn the mortifying fact, that there had ever been sla- 
very in this land, they should, nevertheless, not learn it from the pages of 
the Constitution. These historical proofs will be confirmed, if, on look- 
ing into the Constitution, we shall find, that its framers kept it clear of the 
words " slave " and " slavery ' ' and of all words of like import. 

Now, were it true, that the framers of the Constitution — even all of 
them — sought to smuggle slavery into it — to get it into it, without its be- 
ing seen to ba got into it; nevertheless, the restrictions, which they im- 
posed upon themselves in framing it, made it impracticable to get slavery 
into that instrument. It was an impracticability, which they had them- 
selves laid upon the very threshold of their work. To get slavery into 
such an instrument, as its framers had, from the first, determined, that the 
Constitution should — I do not say, be — but should appear to be — was as 
impossible, as to build up a fiie in the sea. The embodied jirinciples of 
justice and liberty would no more permit the one than the waters would 
permit the other. Talk of mixing slavery with liberty ! Ab well talk of 



11 

"mixingcil with water. ^^ As well," in the words of the immortal poet, 
■"may there be amity and life 'tween fire and snow," Talk of a web, the 
warp of which shall be of liberty and the woof of slavery! — such talk is 
nonsense. The Constitution is either for slavery, or for liberty. Is liberty 
provided for in it, and among its reigning principles'? What, then, if there 
be lines in it, which, by themselves, would make for slavery ? These 
lines, so far as they conflict with the Constitutional provisions for liberty, 
must be thrown out for inconsistency. The wrong must recede before 
the right — not the right before the wrong. 

After making, for the sake of the argument, the admission, that, not- 
withstanding the Declaration of Independence or any thing else, there was 
legal slavery in this land down to the time of the adoption of the Constitu- 
tion, I proceed to take up the Constitution. 

And now, with what feelings, are we to enter upon the examination of 
the Constitution ! It is Claimed, that the white people of the North did, 
some sixty years ago, conspire with the white people of the South to hold 
the black people of this land, both of that and of all coming generations, 
in slavery : and it is further claimed, that the Federal Constitution is the 
Paper, which at once proves, and imparts validity to, this diabolical bar- 
gain : and that, therefore, American citizens are all bound to help carry this 
diabolical bargain into effect. I again inquire, with what feelings are we to 
enter upon the examination of the Constitution'? On the supposition, that 
there was this conspiracy, are our feelings to be on the side of these two 
parties of conspirators 1 God forbid ! we cannot be men — much less can we 
be christians — if we suffer our feelings to enlist on that side. Our sympa- 
thies must be with the third party in the case. Our sympathies must be 
promptly, wholly, constantly, with the poor broken-hearted, outraged 
victims of this conspiracy. We must take up the Constitution with the 
deepest desire to find it clear of all evidence of this conspiracy — or, failing 
•to find it so, to find it full of power to put an end to this conspiracy. In 
a word, if there be this conspiracy, we must take up the Constitution to 
make from it all we can against the conspirators and all we can for those, 
who are conspired against. Do I ask here for aught, that is unreasonable 
— for aught, that is unlawful ? Certainly not. 

My first remark on the Constitution is, that all must admit, that the pro- 
slavery construction of it cannot abide the application of the rule of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, which I have quoted. If slavery be, 
■at all, in the Constitution, nevertheless all must admit, that it is not there in 
express., much less in irresistibly clear terms. All must admit, that a per- 
son, however intelligent — if, nevertheless a stranger to the history of our 
icountry — might read and re-read that Constitution without once suspecting, 



12 

fnat there is slavery in it. I will, for the sake of the argument, take the 
rule in question as unsound and reject it. Nevertheless, I wish all 1o see 
how entirely fatal to every pro-slavery interpretation of the Constitution 
would be the application of this rule. 

We learn two things from the preamble of the Constitution. 1st. Who 
made the Constitution ; and 2d. What they made it for. "We the people 
of the United States" made it. Is this phrase of uncertain meaning "? Then 
must the whole Constitution be void for uncertainty : — for then, the Con- 
stitution does not designate, and then the Government does not know, its 
own citizens. It is said, that it is for the State Governments to determine 
who shall be the citizens of the Federal Government. Then, it is in the 
power of the States to deprive the Federal Government of all citizens and, in 
short, to annihilate our national capacity. But, in point of fact, there is not 
the least uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase : "we the people of the 
United States". It necessarily means all and not a part — every kind and 
not one kind — of the people, who were, at that time, permanent inhabitants 
of the country. To say, that the phrase means but voters, is to say that, 
not only many of the white men, as well as all the black men were shut 
out from citizenship, but also all the white women and white children, as 
well as all the black women and,black children. The voters, in such a 
case, represent the whole permanent population. 

Nothing is plainer than that the}-, who claim, that a part of the people 
was excepted from "we the people," should show the exception in the Con- 
stitution. Moreover, as the exception would be a piece of flagrant injus- 
tice, the Supreme Court of the United States must (I will not say, to be 
right) must, to be consistent with itself, require the proof of it to be couched 
in express and irresistibly clear terms. I digress, for a moment, to ask how, 
in the absence of all proof of this exception, the State of New York can 
justify herself for excluding the colored man from the ballot box 1 Her 
first Constitution was not guilty of this proscription. Under that colored 
men had as free access as white men, to the ballot box. I admit, that the 
right to regulate voting belongs to each State, and not to the Federal Gov- 
ernment. But this right is to be exercised reasonably; and, therefore, not 
with a reference to the color of the hair or the color of the skin. Did justice 
reign in this State, and were our Judiciary delivered from the spirit of caste, 
that part of our State Constitution, which shuts out men from the ballot-box 
because of the color of their skin, would be declared void for its repug- 
nancy to the tenor, spirit and requirements of the Federal Constitution. 
To return from this digression — no argument — nothing worthy of the name 
of argument — can be offered against my definition of "we the people." 
This definition, being unanswerably true, it follows, that, if there wer« 



t3 

•fird,7es in this country, at the time the Constitution was adopted, thatinstro 
ment made them all citizens, and, therefore, made them all free. The first 
line then of the Constitution — the lirst line even of its preamble — is the 
death of slavery. Perhaps, however, an ingenious lawyer would take the 
ground, that the slave part of the people consented to be, and were, there- 
fore, slaves still. Bnt, this ground is untenable for the reasons — 1st. That, 
under a Constitution, which makes all free, none could be slaves, if they 
would — 2d. That, as it is never to be supposed, unless, indeed, the lan- 
guage of the instrument make the supposition unavoidable, that a party to 
a contract consents to the open and flagrant wronging of itself in that 
contract, it is not to be supposed, that a party to the Constitution consented 
therein to their own enslavement and the enslavement of their posterity. 
(Mr. Smith here read a page or two from Lysander Spooner's book on the un- 
constitutionality of slavery— spoke in the highest terms of that book — com- 
mended it to all his hearers — and confessed his great indebtedness to it on 
the present occasion.) 

I will say no more, said Mr. Smith, on that part of the Preamble, \rhich 
informs us who made the Constitution. And on that part of it, which in- 
forms us for what they made it, I say, that one thing, for which it was 
made, was (to use the language of the Preamble, itself) " to secure the 
blessings of liberty :" — not to inflict, or uphold, the curse of slavery — but 
" to secure the blessings of liberty." 

Thus far, then, the Constitution is anti-slavery. And, since we see the 
Goddess of Liberty standing in its porch, may we not hope to find, that 
the whole Constitution constitutes her glorious temple. Let us walk 
through its apartments to see whether they correspond with the porch. 
Or, to drop the figure, let us see whether the body of the Constitution cor- 
responds with its Preamble. 

Ere proceeding to examine the body of the Constitution, let me sa)', that 
the preamble of a law, though not identical with, and though not of equal 
authority with, its enacting clauses, is, nevertheless, a valuable guide in 
interpreting those clauses. 

We have, now, come to the examination of the four provisions of the 
Constitution, which are relied on to prove its pro-slavery character. The 
first respects the apportionment of representatives. It is claimed, that the 
" other persons,'' referred to in this provision, are slaves. We will, for 
the sake of the argument, admit this, for a moment. And what have we 
then 1 — What, but the Constitution telling the ."^lave States, that, so long 
as they remain slave States, they shall, to a certain extent, and to a great 
•extent too, be shorn of political power — of power in the Federal Councils. 
^la'W, does such a diminution of their power help slavery 1 Cerlainl}' not. 



14 

But just the reverse. If,instead of allowing the slave to count but three-fifths 
of a person, the Constitution had allowed the person, who cannot read and 
write, to count but three-fifths of a person, would it have been chargeable 
with favoring, and'putting a bounty upon, illiterateness 1 Certainly not. 
But just the reverse. This clause, therefore, on the supposition, that it re- 
fers to slaves, is to be numbered with the anti-slavery features and anti- 
slavery advantages of the Constitution. 

Bui it is said, that the Constitution is wrong in allowing slaves to count 
at all in the apportionment. Who are they, that say so 1 Not they, sure- 
ly, who are intelligent and true friends of human rights. Because a man 
is Wronged shall he count less than a man ? "A man's a man for a' that." 
God counts every man a unit. And let us beware how we count a man 
less than his Maker counts him. 

It is also said, by way of complaining of the Constitution and proving 
its pro-slavery character, that the slaves should be allowed to vote. I ad- 
mit, that they stiould be. But their not being allowed to is the fault, not 
of the Constitution, but the State Government. The State, and not the 
Federal Government, regulates voting. I admit, that the Constitution 
wrongs the slave, if it count him less than a unit. But, it does not help 
slavery thereby. The State Government, on the contrary, by not allowing 
the slave to vote, both wrongs the slave, and helps slavery. 

But, it was only for the sake of the argument and for the moment, that 
I admitted, that this clause of the Constitution recognizes the existence of 
slavery. True, I might safely make the absolute admission, that it does 
^^— for it would not follow that it approvingly recognizes it. The bare re- 
cognition by the Federal Government of the existence of slavery would not 
impose any obligation on the Federal Government to uphold slavery — 
would not impose any obligation on it to forbear to overthrow slavery. 
But this clause cannot, without doing violence to its language and to the 
canon of interpretation, be made to refer to slavery. The correlative of 
■*' free" in this clause is not slaves. 

The woid "free" in the political papers of England and in such papers 
in this country, at that day, denoted those, who enjoy citizenship, or some 
franchise or especial privilege. Again, we are to interpret a word, if pos- 
sible, in the light of the paper, and so as to harmonize it with the paper, 
in which it is used. But the Constitution does not refer to slaves. At 
least, it is to be proved, that it does. It does, however, refer to aliens, for 
it empowers Congress to naturalize them. Hence, we are to interpret 
"free " as the correlative of aliens. 

Again, the word " free" must be taken as used, in this clause, not only 
in a political, but in a strictly legal sense. What, for instance, can be «, 



1ft 

more purely legal matter than taxation 1 The right to tax, and to deslg'- 
nate the subjects of taxation, is a purely legal right, and the word or word?, 
nsed in creating or describing that right, must, therefore, be used with strict 
legal accuracy Says Gridley (Paige's Reports, 9 : 556,) " the Legislature 
should be deemed to use the term in a legal sense, when applying it to cre- 
ate or describe a legal right." 

We proceed to the examination of the clause respecting the migration 
and importation of persons. And, now, if this clause do refer to slaves, 
what do we learn from it, but that the General Government got the States 
to consent, that, at the end of nineteen years, it might stop their prosecution 
of the slave trade ? Was this pro-slavery on the part of that Government ? 
The very reverse. If I get my drunken neighbor to consent, that, after 
one month, (and one week is more in the life of a man than nineteen yeara 
in the life of a nation,) I may break his bottles, and, if need be, eompelhira 
to be sober, am I, therefore, to be held up as favoring' intemperance ? 

I deny, however, that this clause is to be interpreted, as referring to 
slaves. Surely, the unenslaved as well as the enslaved, can emigrate from 
one part of our country to another, an.l can be the subjects of importation 
also. Why, then, shall we not prefer the meaning, which is innocent, to 
that, which favors crime, and establishes injustice I We must prefer it. 
The legal rules of interpretation require it. 

But, it was, perhaps, unnecessary to examine this clause. It can, 
now, have no power to uphold, or put down, slavery. It expired, by its 
own limitation, more than forty years ago. 

The clause, respecting " domestic violence," is next in order. If there 
•were not to have been slaves in the country, nevertheless would not this 
clause have been proper 1 Whether this clause shall, at s^ny time, ope- 
rate againsti instead of for, the slaves, turns upon what are the views 
and character of the National Executive, at such time. Were the slaves 
violently to assert their right to freedom, nnd were the President a decid- 
ed abolitionist and a true man, he would promptly take the side of the 
slaves. And he would do so — 1st, because be would go for the Federal 
Constitution, and would treat the slave laws as void, because repugnant 
to the Constitution — 2d, because he would regard, not the slaves, but those, 
who rose against them, as the insurgents — because he would regard not 
those, who were striving to deliver themselves from the cruellest bonds, 
but those, who were striving to refasten these bonds, as the guilty ones 
— as the ones guilty of " domestic violence." 

The last of the clauses, claimed to be pro-slavery, is that, which res- 
pects fugitives from service. But, had there been no slaves in the coun- 
try, and no prospect of there being any, this clause, also, would, btill, 



Have been proper. Under tins clause, minor children and lawfully htd'er^- 
tured apprentices, who have lied from those, who are entitled to their servi" 
ces, can be reclaimed. Indeed, the clause must be taken as referring to 
such. It cannot refer to slaves. The fugitives in the clause are capable 
of owing. But slaves cannot owe, any more than horses can owe. It 
is true, that the slave is really a man. But, under the legal fiction, he is- 
only a thing : and a legal fiction in this case, as well as a legal liction in 
every other case, is to be interpreted .strictly, and not e.xtended beyond 
its proper bounds. There are some, however, who claim, that the slave 
can, in the eye of the Federal Constitution, owe service, because in its eye, 
he is a person, and not a thing. I will illustrate the absurdity of the sup- 
position, that the slave can, either on the supposition, that he is a person, 
or on the supposition, that he is a chattel, owe any thing. A person claim- 
ed to be a fugitive slave, is brought before a magistrate. " On what ground 
do you claim his services V^ asks the magistrate. " On the ground," ans- 
wers the claimant, " that he is my property." " But,'' rejoins the magis- 
trate, "the Constitution, even as held by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, admits no right of property in man." "Then," says the claim- 
ant, "I claim his services on the ground, that he is a person." "But," 
replies the magistrate, " it takes two persons to make a bargain. In the 
case of a man and a mouse, one can make the bargain. The man catches 
the mouse ; and the mouse is his, without the consent of the mouse. But, 
far otherwise is it in the case of two persons. If one claim the services of 
the other, he must show the contract, by which that other consented to 
serve him." 

Another reason, why the fugitives in this clause are not slaves, is, 
that they are held to service or labor under the laws. The laws, how- 
ever, do but admit the masters right of property in his slave, as they do 
his like right in his ox. And whether it be the ox or the slave, that is 
lazy 'or unmanageable, the laws will not interfere to coerce service. 
There was not, at the time the Constitution was adopted, a slave law ia^ 
all Christendom, which claimed service or labor from the slave. 

" Under the laws thereof.'' Observe, that the language is not under 
the enactments of the legislature thereof: but " under the laws thereof." 
Hence, this clause cannot, possibly, be brought to the help of the pro- 
slavery interpretation of the Constitution. For the Constitution must 
first, and irrespectively of this clause, be shown to be pro-slavery, ere 
pro-slavery enactments can be called laws. Under our anti-slavery Con- 
stitution, pro-slavery enactments, being repugnant to it, are null and void 
— are no laws. Suppose, that the Virginia Legislature should enact, that 
^e scores of families, who have receutly emigrated from this State io> 



17 

that, shall he slaves — and suppose, further, that these slaves shall suc- 
ceed in escaping lo their old State — would we not deny, that the enact- 
ment is Constitutional, and is, law ? But, why are wo not at liberty 
to take this course with every pro-slavery enactment ? 

Again — the pro-slavery interpretation of this clause is forbidden by 
that clause in the Constitution, which provides, that " Congress shall 
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion." For does not that 
pro-slavery interpretation interfere with the free exercise of religion ? 
Most emphatically it does, if the law ot 179:5 fairly reflects that interpre- 
tation, and trulv answers its demands. For that law threatens its heavy 
penalties upon all, who open their doors to the poor flying and affrighted 
slaves. And can they act the christian, and not see Jesus Christ Himself 
in these his humblest representatives ; and not remember that as they 
do, or do not unto these " least"' ones, they do, or do not, unto Him ? 

The notion, that " the free exercise of religion'' consists in the liberty 
to hold what creed we will, and join what church we will, and observe 
what forms of worship we will, is exceedingly superficial and false. 
There is no " free exercise of religion," where the right to do all the 
deeds, which reason and humanity and religion call for, is not fully ac- 
knowledged. 

And, now, must we believe, that our fathers intended to make this 
whole land the slaveholder's hunting ground? — and to have the public 
authorities everywhere, ay, and, also, as eminent statesmen have recent- 
ly contended, private citizens every where, join in chasing down the 
innocent human prey ? For one, I will not, cannot, believe it. For one 
I will not, cannot, believe, that our fathers were the most merciless of 
all men. Even, under the Jewish code, the escaping servant was not to 
be returned to his master — but was lo he allowed to reside wherever he 
should choose. Even the Spaniards had mercy enough to admit into 
their treaty with the Moors an article, " by which runaway Moorish 
slaves from other parts of the kingdom were made free and incapable of 
being reclaimed by their masters, if they could reach Granada." But, 
under the pro-slavery interpretation of the Federal Constitution, there is 
not even a Granada left to the poor American slave. Under that inter- 
pretation, it is held, that go withersoever he will, in our own nation, or 
in any foreign nation, the two legged hounds and the four legged hounds 
are at liberty to bay upon hi:3 track. In lS2fi our Government was guil- 
ty of the Heaven-defymg crin e of negotiating for the surrender of slaves, 
who had fled to Canada and Blexico. 

And, now, why is it, that t -e must put this construction on the clauFe 
in question 1 Is it because its words reqnire it ? Its words forbid it. It 

3 



18 

is, as we are told, because the framers of this clause intended to couch 
in it this horrid and infernal meaning. But what have we, when con- 
struing this clause, to do with the intentions of its framers ? Nothing. 
Had they, however, the wicked intentions here ascribed to them ? The 
pioof is to the contrary. 

The clause under consideration is called one of the compromises of the 
Constitution. But not one word was said on the subject of it in the Con- 
vention, which framed the Constitution, until twenty days before they 
finished their labors: and then, so far from their being any struggle 
about it, the clause was adopted in nearly its present form, without one 
word of debate, or one dissenting voice. The clause u-as a compromise, 
however, and we will see how it was such. It was introduced, August 
iiSth, with the word " slave •' in it. In that shape, however, it met with 
so little favor, that it was promptly withdrawn. It was introduced, the 
following day, with the word " slave " struck out ; and then, eveiy mem- 
ber of the Convention unhesitalin<Tly acquiesced in it. This, and this 
only, is ihe compromise, which attaches to the clause in que.-^tion. With 
what pro-slavery eyes must he look into this piece of history, who finds 
in it evidence of the pro-slavery character of the Constitution ! 

But, I have not yet done with this clause. A fortnight after it was 
adopted, and when the " Committee of style and arrangement" reported 
the Constitution, the word " servitude " was struck out of the Constitu- 
tion and " service " unanimously inserted in its place, for the avowed 
reason, that " the former expresses the condition of slaves and the latter, 
the obligations of free persons." What a pack of hypocrites the mem- 
bers of the Convention must have been, if they still meant, that the 
word "service" in the clause under consideration, should be construed 
" to express the condition of slaves'." 

I have now disposed of the four provisions of the Constitution, which 
are claimed to be pro-slavery. Is it said, that, notwithstanding they are 
not pro-slavery, the provision for the apportionment of representatives 
operates in favor of slavery, and that the provisions, respecting ''domes- 
tic violence '' and fugitives from service, are liable to be perverted to the 
advantage of slavery ? — ray answer, in that case, is — " then abolish 
slavery — and abolish it immediately." 

I will, now, proceed to enumerate some, and only some of the provi- 
sions of the Consiiiution, which nre incompatible with slavery, and 
which, therefore, demand its abolition. It will be seen, that, in a part 
of these provisions, there is power to abolish slavery. 

1st. "Congress has power to provide for the common defence and ge- 
neral welfare of the United States." But, to how very limited an extent. 



19 

can this power be exercised amidst the influences and obstacles of slave- 
ry ! It is not proper to say, that Congress has this power, if the exercise 
of it may be obstructed by State authority — if the power iiself may be 
rendered entirely, or even partially, nugatory by that authority. It is ab- 
surd to say, that certain laws give a man power to drive his carriage 
through the streets, if, at the same time, otlier laws may be effectually 
pleaded for blocking its wheels. If the States may setup, and give any 
extent to, slavery, and sink themselves into the worst piracies, and so 
create, within their respective limits an atmosphere, in which the Fede- 
ral Government cannot *• live and move and have its being;" then the 
States hitve, virtually, the power of reducing the Federal Government, 
beyond the sphere of its exclusive jurisdiction, to no Government, at all. 

This power to provide &c., Congress can never have faithfully exer- 
cised, so long as it leaves millions of foes in the bosom of the United 
States. Congress can enrol the slaves in the militia, and yield to their 
Constitutional right — " to keep and bear arms." This would, at once, 
abolish slavery, and convert these millions of foes into friends. 

This power of Congress to provide &c. Patrick Henry, at that time 
the orator of America, lield to be ample to efl'ectuate the abolition of 
American slavery. In the Virginia Convention, which passed upon the 
Federal Constitution, Mr. Henry said : " May Congress not say, that 
every black man must fight ? Did we not see a little of this, the last 
war ? We were not so hard pushed, as to make emancipation general. 
But acts of Assembly passed, that every slave, who would go to the ar- 
my, should be free. Another thing will contribute to bring this event 
about. Slavery is detested. We feel its fatal effects. We deplore it 
with all the pity of humanity. Let all these considerations, at some fu- 
ture period, press with full force on the minds of Congress. They will 
read that paper (the Constitution) and see if they have power of manu- 
mission. And have they not, Sir ? Have they not power to provide for 
the general defence and welfare? May they not think, that they call 
for the abolition of slavery ? May they not pronounce all slaves free ? 
— and will they not be wai ranted by that power ? There is no ambigu- 
ous implication or logical deduction. The Paper speaks to the point. 
Thkt have the power in clear and unequivocal terms ; and will 
clearly and certainly exercise it." 

2d. Congress has power to impose a capitation tax. To whom must 
the Government look, in such case, for payment ! To none other, certain- 
ly, than the subject of the poll tax. The Goverment is under no obliga- 
tion to pay attention to the superlatively nonsensical and wicked claim of 
the ownership of men. If it be, then States would have the power to 



20 

defeat the collection of a tax imposed upon its subjects — for it might as- 
sert, that some half dozen paupers within its bounds shall be called the 
owners of all its other subjects. We see, then, how utterly incompatible 
is slavery with this clause. It is so, 1st, because the slave is not liable 
to pay any thing — and 2nd, because slavery could defeat the collection of 
the tax. 

3rd. "Congress shall have power to establish auniform rule of naturali- 
zation." But this power is inconsistent with the right to continue slavery. 
Under this power, Congress can, any hour, naturalize, and confer citizen- 
ship upon, foreigners, or slaves, or whom it will. In other vrords. Con- 
gress can, under this power, give liberty, any hour, to the three millions 
of American slaves. If, at the time the Constitution was made, the slave- 
holders had desired (as, however they did not) to perpetuate slavery, they 
would, if they could, have qualified this absolute and unlimited power of 
naturalization. 

4th. " The Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Have not 

Congress the right, in this clause, to encourage and reward genius, as 

well in the case of him, who is called a slave, as in the case of any other 

person ? Certainly. Every person is entitled to a copy right of his book, 

and to a patent for his meritorious invention. But how incompatible is this 

with slavery, the victim of which has no rights, and the productions of 

whose mind, equally with the productions of his hands, belong to his 

master ! 

5th. " Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque 
and reprisal — to raise and support armies — to provide and maintain a navy." 

Must Congress get the consent of a State, as to whom it may enlist in its 
armies or navies, and as to whom it may grant letters of marque and 
reprisal ? Then, it follows, that Congress has no absolute power for 
carrying on war. Manifestly, Congress can contract with whom it 
pleases — white or black, bond or free — to fight its battles; and can secure 
to each his wages, his pension, his prize-money. But how inconsistent 
is all this with the claim of the slaveholder to the earnings, the will, the 
all, of the soldier, or sailor, whom he might claim to be his slave 1 

6th. " The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
republican form of government." We often hear it said, that the General 
Government should not concern itself with the internal policy and arrange- 
ments of the States. But to neglect to do so might involve its own ruin, 
and also the cruellest wrong aad deepest distress to the masses in one or 
more of the States. Suppose, that in one State, suffrage were universal j 
in another conditioned on the ownership of ten thousand dollars in land 



21 

cr money, in another on the ownership of a dozen slaves ; and in another 
on literary and scientilic attainments; and in the others on still rarer at- 
tainments and possessions, and all differing from each other. What a lack 
cf similarity and sympathy there would be, in that case, between the Con- 
gressional representations of the diflferent States ! What discord in our 
National Councils! What ruin to our National interests! In the next 
place, how cruel and guilty would be the infidelity of the General 
Government to its obligations, were it to leave the masses in a State, who 
are oppressed by aristocratic and despotic forms of Government, to cry 
out, in vain, for a republican form of Government ?■ 

But is it not true, that our Nation is already brought into great peril by 
the slavocratic element in our Federal Councils ? — and is it not also 
true, that, in some of the States, the white, as well as the black masses, are 
already crushed by the slavocratic form of government 1 These masses 
have a fair, Constitutional, and most urgent claim on the nation for repub- 
lican State governments. 

7th. "No State shall pass any bill of attainder." But what is so causeless 
s,nd cruel a bill of attainder, as the attainting of a woman and all her pos- 
terity, to the end of time, for no other offence than having African blood 
in her veins — be it even but one drop, and that accompanied by a purely 
xvhite skin ? 

8th. " The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall no: be suspended, 
unless, when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may re- 
quire it." This writ Blackstone well calls " the most celebrated writ of 
England and the chief bulwark of the Constitution." One of his editors 
Mr. Christian, says that " it is-'this writ, which makes slavery impossible 
in England.'' This writ is wholly incompatible with the right of property 
in man. Such right must render the writ completely impotent. If prop- 
erty can be plead in the prisoner (and possession is proof of ownership) 
the writ is defeated. 

Slavery can be legalized, only by suspending, the writ of Habeas Cor- 
pus, in the case of the slaves. Hut the Constitution provides for no such 
suspension : and, hence, there is no legal slavery in the land. A sus- 
pension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus, in the case of cer- 
tain persons, would be a substantially proper definition of the law of 
slavery. 

I would add under this head, that Federal Judges should be multiplied, 
until, if need be, there be one in every slaveholding county, or even town 
— Judges, who would honestly and efiectually use the writ of Habeas Cor- 
pus in behalf of the deliverance of every slave. 

9th. Slavery is incompatible with the provision of the Constitution in 



favor of the free exercise of religion. The free exercise of religion in- 
volves the right to imparl and receive religious and all useful knowledge. 
But, to forbid (under the severest penalties upon both teacher and learner) 
either the free or the enslaved colored person to read the Bible, or even 
spell the name of Jesus Christ, is admitted to be essential to the mainte- 
nance of slavery. 

10th. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." 

11th. " The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa- 
pers, and etiects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated." These two provisions, which are, on their face, so utterly in- 
compatible with slavery, are said to be negations of Federal power only — • 
not'of the power of the States. My first ansiveris, that no such distinction 
appears in the language of the provisions. The language makes the pro- 
visions apply, as well to the control of the action of State Governments, 
as of the Federal Government. My second answer is, that there is abun- 
dant historical evidence, that the language was designed, as well to res- 
trict State Governments, as the Federal Government.* 

I have, now, gone through with my examination of the Constitution. It 
is not a pro-slavery instrument — is it'? It is an anti-slavery instrument — 
is it not ? It demands the abolition of every part and parcel of American 
slavery — does it not? Why was not this demand obeyed, immediately af- 
ter the adoption of the Constitution ? I admit, that there was, at that time, 
no desire, no purpose, to array the powers of that instrument against slavery. 
The reason of this was, that slavery was regarded, on all hands, as a 
doomed and rapidly expiring evil, and that it was thought better to let it 
live out on sufferance its brief existence — an existence, which could not 
extend beyond that generation — than to disturb the infant and unconsoli- 
dated Nation by putting an immediate stop to it. Many facts might be 
cited to show, that the end of slavery was then thought to be drawing near. 
Among these, is the fact, that the price of a slave, at that period, was nbt 
a fourth, or a third, as great as now. Another is, that such men, as Wash- 
ington and Jefferson, were laboring for the abolition of slavery. Another 
is, that, whilst the Convenlion, sitting in Philadelphia, were framing our 
anti-slavery Constitution, the Congress, sitting in New York, were, with 
but one dissenting voice (,and that of a Northern member,) passing the cele- 
brated Ordinance, which excludes slavery forever from that vast Territory, 
comprising the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. 

I have given the reason, why the Constitution was not used, as soon as 
it was adopted, to put slavery to death. This reason is, in brief, that it 

* See Appendix. 



•was deemed needless to kill what was dyinj^ so certainly and so rapidly. 
But, what is the reason, why it was not put to death, some ten or twenty 
years afterwards, when it was found to have revived, and to he strength- 
ening and extending itself? Alas, slavery was hecoming immensely lu- 
crative ! — and the avarice of the Nation — that passion so mighty to para- 
lyze the moral sense and engulf the virtuous affections — was, now, inter- 
ested in slavery, and enlisted for its protection. 

Eli Whitney's cotton gin is the secret of the revival and power of Ame- 
rican slaveiy. It was invented in 1793. The total amount of cotton ex- 
ported from this country, previous to that year, was but 742,860 pounds. 
The export of 1795 was six and a quarter millions — of 1800 seventeen 
millions and four-fifths — of 1835 three hundred and eighty-six millions. 
The growth of slavery, has kept pace with the growth of cotton. The 
half million of slaves, with which we began our national existence, are 
multiplied into three millions. 

Since the invention of the gin, numerous causes for upholding and exten- 
ding slavery, have come into being. One has begotten another. They 
have multiplied themselves indefinitely. The necessity of holding this or 
that National political party together ; has been one cause for continuing and 
favoring slavery : the necessity of holding this or that National religious 
party together has been another. Every blow at slavery is a blow at the 
harmony and at the very existence of these parties. How corrupt, then, 
must be American politics — how corrupt, then, must be American religion 
— all can judge. 

One of the most efficient causes, at the present day, for the reconcile- 
ment of the public mind to slavery, is the belief, that some of the framers 
and adopters of the Constitution did really mean to get slavery into it. 
But, what if they did? The only pertinent question, at this point, is: 
"Did they get it in?" If, in drawing up a paper to express a bargain 
with my neighbor and myself, I try to embody a fraudulent claim; but 
couch it in terms so obscure and enigmatical, that the Court, before whom 
I seek to enforce it, cannot see it; must the Court, nevertheless, al- 
low my claim 1 Must the Court take the will for the deed, and reward my 
endeavour to cheat my neighbour, albeit the endeavour was unsuccessful 1 

Another, and still more efficient reason for the public acquiescence in 
slavery, is that its victims belong to a weak, and helpless, and despised 
race — that they may, therefore, be outraged with impunity — and that the 
legality of their enslavement need not, therefore, be strictly inquired into. 

Alas, ala?, my colored countrymen, was there ever so ill-starred and 
wronged a people as you are ? Whilst, in the case of other persons, it is 
held, j^ that nothing short of a positive, definite, clear, certain law will suf- 



24 

lice to fasten upon its victims the chains of slavery ; in your case it is I:€l(?^ 
that the loosest inferences and vaguest implications are sufficient to secure 
this horrid result. No respectable lawyer would say, that, by the force of 
guch inferences and implications, a man should be deprived of his horse, or 
even of his dog. Nevertheless, almost all lawyers and almost all othe? 
men, not excepting the most prominent abolitionists, maintain, that, by 
the force of such inferences and implications, men may be deprived of 
more than their life — even of their liberty — for liberty is more precious 
than life. The grave of liberty is more to be dreaded than the grave of ths 
body. I said, my colored brethren, that even the most prominent aboli- 
tionists are against you at this vital point. That they are is among you/ 
heaviest calamities. 

How would Mr. Clay, or Mv. Webster, or Mr. Calhonn meet the propo- 
sition, that the men of this country, who belong to the proud and strong 
Anglo-Saxon race, can, by the force of such inferences and implica- 
tions, as we have alluded to — can, by the force of a Constitution, which, 
at the most, does not make one express allusion to slavery — be held in 
slavery ? They would scout it, with the utmost contempt. Why, then, 
do these gentlemen hold, that such inferences and implications are suffi:- 
cient to bind in slavery the three millions of our colored countrymen ? 
Ah, it is because these three millions are weak and powerless; and thai 
■we may, therefore, wrong them, as we will. 

I insist, that the Constitution does not allow the three millions of out 
colored countrymen to be held in slavery; and I insist on this, because I 
insist, that the law to hola Africans in slavery shall be as positive and de- 
finite and stringent, as the law to hold Anglo-Saxons in slavery. 

How long, oh how long, shall the North, and even the abolitionists of 
the North, continue to sustain the claim of the South to the Constitution- 
ality of slavery 1 Just so long as they do, the slaveholder will be strong, 
and his victims will be powerless in his grasp. Just so long as they do, 
the poor black men of the South, ay, and also the poor white men 
of the South, will crouch down and tremble around him. But strip 
hilii of the power and influence, which he derives from the sheer 
falsehood, that the Constitution is pro-slavery, and the charm is gone — 
and he has become as weak as other men — and the public sentiment, 
which had hitherto braced him up, now falls away from him — and, now, 
he is derided for his impotence — and, now, he is hated with im.punity — 
and, now, his slaves rise up around him, and successfully assert their claim 
to freedom. '' 

But, I must hasten to the end of my remarks. 

Gentlemen of the Legislature ! you have honored me greatly, in per- 



25 

mitting me, a private, uniiifliiential individual, to appear before you — in 
permitting me, who am ignorant of all law, to address to you an argument 
on the gravest question of Constitutional law. May I, now, ask, that 
you will honor yourselves ? — and honor yourselves, too, infinitely more 
than you have honored me ? Do yourselves the immeasurable, the im- 
mortal honor to grant the prayers of those petitioners, whom I represent 
on this occasion. 

Do this, gentlemen, and you will be among the bravest and best bene- 
factors of mankind. Do this, gentlemen, and you will have done an 
amount of good, that few men have it in their power to do. Strike this 
heavy blow for freedom — and, in less than five years, it will be repeated 
by the Legislature of every Free State in the Union. Strike this heavy 
blow for freedom — and, ere ten years pass away, the doors of the great 
Southern prison-house wmU ily open, and the millions of imprisoned ones 
will taste the sweets of liberty. 

Gentlemen, will you do it 1 You will not, if you stoop to inquire how 
such a proceeding of justice and mercy will be viewed by Southern poli- 
ticians; or how it will affect this or that political party. You will not 
do it, if you pause to parley with the tempters, which, in such a case, are 
wont to cluster around even the good man's soul, and ply its integrity 
with their seductions. But, you will do it, gentlemen, if you " remember 
them, that are in bonds as bound with them" — if you put your souls in 
their souls stead, and feel, as if the chains upon their limbs are also upon 
your own, and as if the iron, which has entered their souls, has also en- 
tered yours. In a word, you will do it, if you resign yourselves to the 
counsels of reason and humanity and religion. You will do it, if you for- 
get not, that every man is to render, at the last day, an account of all the 
deeds done in the body. 



APPEIDII. 



It is arojued, that these Constitutional specific denials of the deprivation 
and violation of lights are limitations upon the power of the Federal Go- 
vernment only. It is so argued, on the ground, that, when the Constitution 
does not point out, whether the limitations are on Federal or State pow- 
er, it is to be inferred, that they are on Federal power, and on that only. 

Whence, however, the justificatinn of such inference ? From the fact, 
it is answered, that the Federal power is the subject matter of the Consti- 
tution — is that of which it treats — is that, which it constitutes. But, this 
is not a just view of the case. The paper, called the Federal Constitution, 
is as distinctly a paper for fixing limits, within which the States shall keep 
themselves, as it is for constituting the Federal Government ; — and the one 
purpose is no less important, or necessary, than the other. What, how- 
ever, if the inference referred to were warrantable ? So far, certainly, as 
the original Constitution is concerned, it matters not — for nothing of the un- 
certainty in question is to be found in it. The original Constitution shows 
too plainly to make a more frequent recurrence of the word " Congress" ne- 
essary that the 8th and 9th section of its 1st article were devoted to the enu- 
meration of the powers and disabilities of Congress. It also shows plainly, 
that the 10th section of the same article was devoted to the enumeration of 
the disabilities of the States. All this is too plain ever to have been doubted. 
We have lying before us an old copy of the Constitution, printed in Virginia, 
in which " Powers of Congress " is at the head of the 8th section, and 
" Restrictions upon Congress " is at the head of the 9th section, and " Res- 
trictions upon Respective States" is at the head of the 10th section. 

Why, however, it is asked, was it necessary to have a repetition of the 
word " State " in the 10th section, any more than a repetition of the word 
" Congress" in the 9th section? The ready answer is, that it would not 
have been necessary, had the negation of State powers been preceded by 
the enumeration of State powers, as is the negation of Federal powers by 
the enumeration of Federal powers. 

So far as respects the sections we have referred to, the Constitution is, 
surely, not to be charged with making room for the looseness of inference. 
It had just devoted a section to limitations on the Federal power. It pro- 
ceeds to devote the next section to limitations, and some of them identical 
with limitations in the other section. What, but upon State powers, could 
these limitations be upon"? And yet, to avoid the necessity of inference, 
the word " State " is repeated several times, in connection with these limi- 
tations. We add, where, in the original Constitution, either before or af- 
ter the three sections spoken of, is it left to inference, whether the powers 
granted, or denied, be Federal or State powers I No where. 

The prohibition in the 9th section: "No ex post facto law^ or bill of 



28 

attainder shall be passed," is that, which is relied oa to prove, that any 
prohibition in the Constitution, which like this, does not, in terms, apply 
to any Government, is to be construed as applying; to the Federal Govern- 
ment, and that only. But we have shown, that the place and connection 
in the Constitution of this recited prohibition superseded the necessity of 
applying it, in terms, to the Federal Government. Were there a reasonable 
doubt, (which there is not,) that the place and conneetion of this prohibi- 
tion determine the application, we should be at liberty to look away from 
the Constitution to collateral testimonies. And how quick would the doubt 
be dispelled ! For, not only did the draft of the Constitution, which was 
under discussion, when near the close of the Convention, this prohibition 
was inserted — not only we say, did this draft include in one chapter, both 
the powers and disabilities of Conarress — and not only did the chapter, by 
beo;inninfr with the words: "The Legislature of the United States,'' de- 
termine, that every part of it is a-jplicable to that Legislature, and that on- 
ly — but the prohibition was moved and inserted in the following words : 
"The Legislature (Congress) sball pass no bill of attainder, nor any ex 
post facto law." '• The Committee of style and arrangement '' made their 
Report a few days afterwards, in which they slightly varied the phraseolo- 
gy of this and other parts of the Constitution. 

We now pass on to the amendments of the Constitution : for it is in 
them, that we find those specific denials of the deprivation and violation of 
rights, which forbid slavery. 

Twelve articles of amendment were propo-ed by the first Congress. 
The first three, and the last two, do, in terms, refer to the Federal Govern- 
ment, and that only. To what Government or Governments, the other 
seven refer is a matter of inference. Whilst, however, it would be a to- 
tal violation of the laws of inference to say, that they refer to the Federal 
Government only, it would be in full accordance with these laws to say, 
that, because the other five expressly refer to the Federal Governments, these 
seven refer to the State Governments, or to both the Federal and Slate Go- 
vernments. 

Many, there doubtless are, who, because the first one of the adopted 
amendments expresses its reference to the Federal Government, infer, that 
there is the like reference, in the case of all the other amendments. But it 
must be borne in mind, that the first two of the proposed amendments were 
rejected — that for this reason, the third came to be numbered the first — and 
that all three of them refer expressly to the Federal Government. To say 
that the 11th and 12th of the adopted amendments were proposed by Con- 
gress, after the other ten were adopted, may be to some persons a neeessa- 
ry explanation. 

We have given one reason, why a part of the amendments of the Con- 
stitution refer to the State Governments exclusively, or to both the Fede- 
ral and State Governments. Another reason is, that they are, in their na- 
ture and meaning, as applicable to a State Government, as to the Federal 
Government. And another is, that, if there be only a reasonable doubt, 
whether they refer to the Federal Government exclusively, they should be 
construed, as referring to the State Governments also : for human liberty 
is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt ; and this is a case, in 
which human liberty is most vitally and extensively concerned. 

We are not at liberty to go back, nor aside, of the Constitution to in- 
quire, whether the amendments in question, are, or are not, limitations on 
Slate power. There they are, as suitably, in their terms, nature, and 



29 

meaning, limitations on State, as on Federal power. This being the 
fact, we are to believe, that the people, when ailnptnipj them by their Leg- 
islatures, interpreted them as having the two-fold ajjplicntinn, which we 
claim for them. This being the fact, the people now, whether their fath- 
ers did, or did not, may insist, and must insist, on this two-fold applica- 
tion. In the name, then, of reason and religion, of humanity and God, we 
protest against the supplantinir of our just interpretation with one, which 
shall minister to the diabolical purpose of holding millions of our country- 
men and their posterity in the cruellest and foulest bondaij;e. 

Were, however, the Constitution obscure on the point under considera- 
tion, we should, nevertheless, not be without collateral testimony, in be- 
ha'f of our interpretation It is an interesting and apposite historical fact, 
that almost all the amendments of the Constitution, and all of them, in 
which, on the present occasion, we are concerned, were taken from the 
Bill of Rights, which the Virginia Convention proposed to have incorpo- 
rated with the Federal Constitution. But this Bill of Rights speaks neither 
of Congress nor of the Federal Government : and it evidently contemplates 
absolute security : — security, as well from the invasion of State, as of 
Federal power. 

Were we, in quest of further collateral testimony, to go to the proceed- 
ings of the Congress, which submitted the amendments, we should liiid, 
that Mr. Madison was the first person to move in the matter ; that he pro- 
posed two series of amendments, one of them alTecting Federal, and the 
other State powers; and that it was a part of his proposition to have them 
interwoven in the original Constitution — for instance, the negations of 
Federal power to be included in the 9th section of the 1st article, and the 
negations of State power to be included in the 10th section of that article. 
We should also find, that several of the amendments, which he proposed to 
have included in the 10th section are, in substance, and well nigh to the 
very letter, identical with amendments, which are now a part of the Con- 
stitution. We should also find Mr. Mndison justifying himself in the fol- 
lowing words for his proposition to impose limitations on State power — 
" I think there is more danger of these powers being abused by the State 
Governments, than by the Government of the United States" — " It must be 
admitted, on all hands, that the State Governments are as liable to attack 
these invaluable privileges, as the General Government is, and therefore 
ought to be as cautiously guarded against" — "I should, therefore, wish to 
extend this interdiction, and add, that no State shall violate, &c.'' — "If 
there was any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from 
infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary, that they 
should be secured against the State Governments. He thought, that if 
they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide against the 
other, and was satisfied, that it would be equally grateful to the people." 

By lookino; into the Congressional proceedings referred to, we should 
also find, that the House of Representative^, instead of following i\Ir. 
Madison's plan of distributing the amendments through the original Con- 
stitution, and so applying one to the Federal and another to the State 
Governments, made them a supplement to the original Constitution, and 
left a part of them, couched in such terms, as render them equally appli- 
cable to the Federal and State Governments. It should, also, be borne 
in mind, that this plan of Mr. Madison, which was embodied in the Re- 
port of a Committee, was kept, a long time, before the attention of the 
House. We should, moreover, find, that whatever may have been said by 



30 

ihis or that speaker, respectinoj the application of this or that amendment, 
no vote was taken, declaring that all, or any, of the amendments apply to 
the Federal Government. And whilst, on the other hand, there was no 
vote taken, declarinj? the application of any of the amendments to the State 
Government, there was a vote taken, which serves to show, that the House 
did not mean to have all the amendments ap])ly to the Federal Govern- 
ment exclusively. The vote was on the followino; proposed amend- 
ment : " No person shall be subject, in case of impeachment, to more than 
one trial, or one punishment for the same otTence, nor shall be compelled 
to be a witness ajjainst himself, nor he deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, &c." Mr. Partridjre, of Massachusetts, moved 
to insert after " same offence" the words: "by any law of the United 
States." His motion was lost. The House would restrain a State, as well 
as the Nation, from enacting such an unrighteous and oppressive law. 

What, if any, were the proceedings of the Senate, re-pecting the amend- 
TAents of the Constitution, except to concur with the House in recommend- 
ing them, we do not know — for its five first sessions were with closed 
.doors. 



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